

TIME

THE WEEKLY NEWSMAGAZINE

September 25, 1964 Vol. 84, No. 13

THE NATION

ISSUES

The Itchy-Finger Image

Republican Barry Goldwater is far, far behind in his race for the presidency—and rather than gaining ground, he is losing it. A Gallup poll last week showed that since July's Republican Convention in San Francisco, Goldwater has dropped by two points, to 31% while Democratic President Lyndon Johnson has gained by six, to 64%. The Gallup survey is borne out by almost every other political indicator.

Why is Barry doing so badly? Certainly not out of any vast national veneration for Johnson. A great number of Americans feel that in voting for Johnson they will only be opting for the lesser of two evils. This feeling was most dramatically described in a Sunday sermon by the Very Rev. Francis B. Sayre Jr., dean of Washington's Episcopal Cathedral and a man who, as Woodrow Wilson's grandson, was born in the White House.

Two Men. "I suspect," said Sayre, "that thousands, even millions, of our countrymen this summer, viewing the extravaganzas that were produced at the Cow Palace in San Francisco and at Convention Hall in Atlantic City, felt something like the Israelites must have felt when finally they were thrust into exile . . . This summer we beheld a pair of gatherings at the summit of political power, each of which was completely dominated by a single man—the one, a man of dangerous ignorance and devastating uncertainty; the other, a man whose public house is splendid in its every appearance, but whose private lack of ethic must inevitably introduce termites at the very foundation."

"The electorate of this mighty nation is left homeless, then, by such a pair of nominees. It knows not where to turn. Our people are in a great dilemma, and there is no corner of the country which you may visit today where you do not feel this profoundly. We stare fascinated at the forces that have produced such a sterile choice for us: frustration and a federation of hostilities in one party; and in the other, behind a goodly façade, only a cynical manipulation of power."

Although he was disputed by his own bishop, the Rt. Rev. William Creighton ("Perhaps I have more confidence in the American people's ability to make

wise political choices than the dean has"), Sayre was far from alone in his opinion, as shown in extensive interviews by TIME correspondents.

"I think Goldwater is just beyond belief," says Denver Playwright Robert Owens. "I just don't think he represents the Republican Party. Johnson leaves me very cold, but I am going to ring doorbells for him, and I'm going to vote for

PAUL SCHUTZER—LIFE



DEAN SAYRE

To many, the choice is sterile.

him." Says Elizabeth Carey, a Burlington, Vt., secretary (and a Republican): "I don't think too much of President Johnson, but I guess I'm really afraid of Senator Goldwater." Says G. Kinneer Pash, a Los Angeles securities analyst: "In general, you don't find too many people who are very pro-Johnson in the sense that they say 'If I had to pick one man for the White House, I would pick Johnson.' Mostly people are neutral on him and are negative on Goldwater."

Just Plain Scared. But not even such generally expressed opinions answer the basic question. If Lyndon is less than beloved, then why is he running so far ahead of Goldwater? The answer is easy: Goldwater's public image is that of a man with an itchy finger on the nuclear trigger, while Johnson has man-

aged to portray himself as the responsible, restrained keeper of nuclear peace.

Interviews with people of all political persuasions, at all economic and educational levels, in all parts of the U.S., find this sentiment constantly repeated. "Goldwater and his nuclear stand," says Denver Auto Salesman Arnold Grand, "scare me to death." Says Nashville Trucker John A. Wilson: "You've got to think about all this nuclear stuff. I don't think it will ever be used, but with Goldwater in there and the way he talks and acts, I'm afraid we could get in a spot where we'd have to use it."

Atlanta Computer Programmer Dan Roberson says: "Almost everyone I know who's against Goldwater is afraid he'll lead the country into war. It's by far their biggest reason for being against him." Says a Republican physician from Vermont: "I don't like President Johnson's history of political dealings, but I just can't vote for Goldwater. The man is sincere, but he is dangerous in this day and age. I don't think he knows what he is going to say next, and you can't run a country that way in the nuclear age."

While Goldwater vehemently protests that he is not nuke-happy, it is this reputation that is ruining his chances for election (*see following cover story*). Unless and until he can rid himself of the image, he hasn't a hope of entering the White House.

The Fear & the Facts

(See Cover)

A little girl, as pretty as anybody's image of his own daughter, appears on the television screen. She carries an ice cream cone. It certainly looks good enough to eat—but is it? A hoarse, anxious, motherlike voice is heard: "Know what people used to do? They used to explode bombs in the air. You know children should have lots of vitamin A and calcium. But they shouldn't have strontium 90 or cesium 137. These things come from atomic bombs, and they're radioactive. They make you die. Do you know what people finally did? They got together and signed a nuclear test ban treaty. And then the radioactive poison started to go away. But now there's a man who wants to be President of the United States, and he doesn't like this treaty. He fought against it. He even voted against it. He

wants to go on testing more bombs. His name is Barry Goldwater. If he's elected, they might start testing all over again."

Another little girl appears on the screen. She is strolling through a pleasant field. She stoops, picks a daisy, starts plucking its petals while counting, in the fashion of children from time immemorial. "One, two, three . . ." A man's doom-laden voice comes in stronger and stronger, finally drowning out the child's words. The man is counting backward: "Ten, nine, eight . . ." The countdown ends, and the screen erupts in atomic explosion, followed by the voice of Lyndon Baines Johnson, who says somberly: "These are the stakes: to make a world in which all of God's children can live, or go into the dark. We must either love each other or we must die."

These political commercials have recently appeared on television under the

BASSET—NEW YORK WORLD-TELEGRAM AND SUN



"OKAY . . . WHO'S THE WISE GUY THAT HUNG THIS ON ME?"

sponsorship of the Democratic National Committee. Their obvious implication: if Barry Goldwater is elected President, eating ice cream will be dangerous, and daisy plucking will be a thing of the past.

Vicious? Of course. But the very fact that such commercials are being used speaks mouthfuls about what now stands as the decisive issue of the 1964 presidential campaign—the argument over control of nuclear weaponry.

An Educational Program. That issue is killing Barry Goldwater. He knows it—and so far he has refused to retreat. He has been scalded by Democrats, pickled by pundits, depicted as a monster by cartoonists, scolded by fellow Republicans. But, insists Barry, "I want to educate the American people to lose some of their fear of the word 'nuclear.'

When you say 'nuclear,' all the American people see is a mushroom cloud. Now a nuclear weapon in political terms may be a mushroom cloud. But for military purposes, it's just enough firepower to get the job done."

Lyndon Johnson also realizes the importance of the nuclear issue—and he has exploited it with consummate skill. In his speeches, he constantly uses the words "responsibility" and "restraint." He does not need to mention Goldwater's name: everybody knows who and what he is talking about.

In point of fact, the nuclear issue is one that should be pondered deeply by men everywhere. It certainly has a valid place in any presidential campaign. But so far this year, neither side has fully, accurately, or even honestly explained the basic conflicts involved. As a result there are more confusions and misconceptions about the nuclear issue than about almost any other in recent U.S. political history.

Whose Trigger Finger? What are the facts? Within the context of this year's politics, Goldwater first got himself into nuclear trouble in October of 1963 when, at a Hartford, Conn., press conference, and in his ordinary, offhand fashion, he suggested that NATO "field commanders" (plural) be given greater discretion about when to use tactical nuclear weapons in the event of attack.

Goldwater later insisted that he had been misquoted, that he was referring only to the supreme commander of NATO. No matter. By then the fat was in the fire. In the New Hampshire presidential primary, New York's Governor Nelson Rockefeller, campaigning against Goldwater, cried: "How can there be sanity when he wants to give area commanders the authority to make decisions on the use of nuclear weapons?" Goldwater, not quite to the point, retorted that he had never proposed to "let every second lieutenant" make nuclear decisions.

Since then, under mounting criticism, Goldwater has constantly tried to clarify his stand, and has consistently succeeded in confusing it. As of now, the fair exposition of his position would be: ► He would give only NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, presently U.S. General Lyman Lemnitzer, any sort of option to use nuclear weapons without direct, specific authorization from the President of the U.S. He has said: "The NATO commander should not be required to wait until the White House calls a conference to decide whether these weapons should be used."

► The option to Lemnitzer would be to use "only tactical, not strategic" nuclear weapons. Goldwater has described these tactical "nukes" as "conventional—any weapon carried by an infantryman or a team of infantrymen." Speaking last month at a Veterans of Foreign Wars convention in Cleveland, he called them "these small, conventional nuclear weapons, which are no more powerful than the firepower you have faced on

the battlefield. They simply come in a smaller package."

Dreaming or Leading? Every time Goldwater has spoken on the nuclear issue, his political critics, both Democratic and Republican, have leaped into the argument. Before the Republican Convention in San Francisco, Pennsylvania's Governor William Scranton, then running for the G.O.P. presidential nomination himself, asked: "What does it mean to be a conservative? Does it mean you must be a trigger-happy dreamer in a world that wants from America not slogans but sane leadership?" Again, Scranton said of Goldwater: "He says the decision to unleash nuclear war should be made not by the President but by the commanders in the field."

In Atlantic City, Democratic Convention Keynote John Pastore cried that "on the question of whose finger should be on the trigger of the atomic bomb, that power today rests solely with the President of the United States. That is exactly where it should remain, and we Democrats mean to keep it

HAYNIE—LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL



"MOMMY, WHY ARE THE OTHER KIDS 'FRAID T'PLAY WITH ME?"

there . . . I am disturbed when I hear anyone speak so glibly and loosely on the use of these weapons and who should make the decision to use them." The Democratic platform specifically declares: "Control of the use of nuclear weapons must remain solely with the highest elected official in the country—the President of the United States."

Democratic Vice-Presidential Nominee Hubert Humphrey is going around asking audiences: "The question before the electorate is simple, prophetic, profound—which of these men, Lyndon Johnson or Barry Goldwater, do you want to have his hand on the nuclear trigger?" (As against that, G.O.P. Veep Nominee William Miller says that by the time a NATO commander under attack got in touch with Johnson to see if he could use nuclear weapons, it "might be too late if he had to get Lyndon on the phone driving his car at 100 miles an hour in Texas.")

In *Ghastly Hues*, Johnson himself conjures up Dr. Strangelove-type images of the "madman" who unleashes nuclear war. He paints a picture of any such war in ghastly hues. Said he in his Detroit Labor Day speech: "In the first nuclear exchange, 100 million Americans and more than 100 million Russians would be dead. And when it was over, our great cities would be in ashes, and our fields would be barren, and our industry would be destroyed, and our American dreams would have vanished." Last week, in Seattle, Lyndon upped his casualty figures to 300 million, not including "unborn generations forever maimed." Without ever precisely saying so, he gives the strong impression that he will never let any such catastrophe happen by reason of having delegated an iota of his authority to anyone, including a NATO commander.

Does the President of the U.S. really believe that 100 million of his countrymen would be killed in "the first exchange"? If so, it would be only minimum prudence, not to say Christian charity and perhaps even good politics, for him to begin immediately the greatest shelter-building program imaginable, to save possibly 1%, or 1,000,000, of the doomed.

Ignorance & Inaccuracy. Between the opposing positions on control over the use of nuclear weapons, there is a vast area of ignorance—or, to use the kindest word, inaccuracy.

There is a general supposition that U.S. law requires that the signal for use of any sort of nuclear weaponry must come directly from the President. There is no such provision in the law. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as amended, in its most relevant clause provides only that the President may direct the Atomic Energy Commission "to deliver such quantities of special nuclear material or atomic weapons to the Department of Defense for such use as he deems necessary in the interest of national defense."

Of course, the President, in his constitutional role as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, has final responsibility for all matters pertaining to the national defense. But he can, must, and in countless ways does delegate his authority every day of his White House life. There is nothing whatever in the law to prevent him from delegating to, say, a NATO commander, authority to use nuclear weapons under certain circumstances.

Never Any Doubt. Goldwater insists that the President should delegate such authority. Johnson lets on that he can't and won't. The fact is that he already does, as did Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy before him. In 1957, the congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy received written notification that plans were being developed to give NATO's supreme commander in Europe the right to use nuclear weapons in certain contingencies—such as the incapacity of the President or the break-



GENERALS LEMNITZER & NORSTAD (1962)
Should there be a White House conference first?

down of communications between Europe and the U.S.


Those plans are now in operation. All are classified top secret, but they apply not only to NATO's commander, but to the commander of the North American Air Defense. Some are written, but word-of-mouth communication between the President and the NATO commander is also important. Former NATO Commander Lauris Norstad, for example, never had any doubt about his authority to act in the event of an attack on Western Europe during the Cuba missile crisis of 1962: he could use his tactical atomic weaponry.

Said Norstad in a recent conversation with a friend: "In every crisis that arose under President Eisenhower and President Kennedy, there never was a time when I felt that there was any possibility of lack of complete meeting of the minds between the President and the Supreme Commander as to what should be done in an emergency."

"Dangerously Misleading." Goldwater shows appalling ignorance when he intimates that there are atomic weapons

so small and well-packaged that they can be carried around by an infantryman, and that these weapons do not really have much more explosive power than some of the gunpowder arms of World War II. The fact is that the U.S.'s smallest operational nuclear weapon, the Davy Crockett, carries a minimum power package equivalent to 40 tons of TNT—as opposed to World War II's powerful "blockbuster" bomb, which packed an explosive load of about 1½ tons.

The Davy Crockett, a recoilless rifle, comes in two sizes, one weighing 116 lbs., the other 371 lbs., and can be fired from a tripod by a crew of three men. With a range of up to 2½ miles, the Davy Crockett can annihilate a dug-in infantry battalion, wipe out a massed formation of 45 to 50 tanks, or destroy a huge bridge. Two versions of the 155-mm. howitzer—one a towed weapon weighing 12,700 lbs., and the other a self-propelled weapon weighing 54,200 lbs.—fire an explosive load of 40 to 100 tons up to 11.2 miles. Beyond that, the punch of the Army's tactical nuclear



weaponry scales rapidly upward. The 12.7-mile-range Little John rocket carries a power package of over 20 kilotons; the 24.2-mile Honest John 100 to 150 kilotons; the 135-mile Sergeant over 100 kilotons; and the 400-mile Pershing, largest of the Army's "tactical" nuclear weapons, over 200 kilotons. Thus the Johnson Administration's Deputy Defense Secretary, Cyrus R. Vance, has a real point when he says of some of Goldwater's statements: "Small" and "conventional" are dangerously misleading and totally inappropriate when applied to any nuclear weapon."

Crossing the "Fire Break." The Administration's fear of firing any sort of nuclear weapon is based largely on the so-called "fire break" theory. That theory holds that the single step from use of the largest gunpowder weapon to

use of the smallest tactical nuclear weapon would mean crossing the "fire break" area between limited war and all-out, intercontinental, thermonuclear disaster. Says Vance: "Once you use any nuclear device, no matter how small, you move completely into another world."

Yet the fact is that since 1954, NATO itself has based its defense planning, even against conventional attack, on "using atomic weapons from the outset of a war." In a mere gunpowder war, NATO planners estimate that their forces could withstand a massive Soviet attack for a bare three days before being forced back to the banks of the Rhine; within 30 days the NATO troops would be swept from the Continent.

Some Strange Blips. Goldwater argues that such critical-area commanders as NATO's Lemnitzer should be

given atomic discretion because there is always the possibility that a communications breakdown might consume vital hours before word of a crisis got to Washington. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's civilian Pentagon says that argument is nonsense, boasts of a worldwide U.S. communications setup that could put a commander in touch with the President within two minutes under any conceivable circumstances.

Last week Goldwater's point received new credibility. The Pentagon went into a headline-screaming flap over reports of another Tonkin Gulf incident. U.S. destroyers in the area reported seeing strange blips on their radar screens, assumed a new attack by North Vietnamese PT boats, started firing. But, if only because of the confusion existing on the destroyers, communication with the Pentagon failed to make clear what actually was happening.

It was a full 28 hours before a tight-lipped McNamara appeared before newsmen to read a 146-word communiqué and refused to entertain any questions. Gist of his statement: two unnamed U.S. destroyers "were menaced" by four "unidentified vessels" and opened fire, after which the "vessels" disappeared.

Between the original alarm and the dénouement, Goldwater seized upon the opportunity to deride the communications system. Snorted Barry: "With the great communications system which McNamara is always bragging about, they are waiting for an airmail letter to find out just what did happen."

Planning to Share. Another element of nuclear "control" has to do with the sharing of nuclear weapons by the U.S. and its NATO allies. Under present law, the U.S. cannot turn over any of its nukes to any ally to be fired at the ally's discretion. But the NATO allies feel strongly that they should have more than nominal influence over the use of the U.S. nuclear weapons that are, after all, their only real defense against Communist invasion.

The dilemma is one that Goldwater seeks to solve with some rather fuzzy talk about "sharing." Says he: "All NATO forces stationed in Europe, regardless of nationality, should be equipped and trained in the use of nuclear weapons, particularly of the so-called battlefield, or tactical, variety." Goldwater has been criticized for this stand, and last week in Seattle, President Johnson, even while admitting that "the dignity and interests of our allies demand that they share nuclear responsibility," warned against the fearful possibility of "nuclear spread."

Yet despite the fact that Goldwater is suffering political damage from his talk about "sharing," the possibility of doing just that has been discussed by NATO-nation leaders for years. The so-called Multilateral Force, first formally promulgated by President Kennedy, is one effort to solve the problem. Under the MLF plan, atom-armed sur-

A PLAN TO SHARE THE WEAPONS

REPUBLICAN GOLDWATER'S suggestion that the U.S. "share" know-how about and control over its nuclear weaponry with NATO allies is one that has been seriously considered by U.S. leaders during the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. Last week former NATO Commander Lauris Norstad, now president of Owens-Corning Fiberglas International, appeared before 2,500 people at the Mayo Centennial Symposium in Rochester, Minn., and came up with some "sharing" proposals that would, in his educated opinion, enable the U.S. to "get on with the business of developing a solution that would have some chance of being accepted on both sides of the Atlantic."

Questions. Said Norstad: "For too long we Americans have worked on the assumption that the nations of Europe would be satisfied, or would have to be satisfied, to leave the nuclear elements of the common defense to U.S. invention, control and direction. For a number of years, Europeans have been addressing two questions to Americans with increasing bluntness and urgency.

"First, since the Europeans depend upon the common defense, and since the NATO military forces in Europe themselves depend to a considerable extent on nuclear weapons, should there not be an absolute guarantee that some minimum stock of these weapons will be available in an emergency, even if the U.S. might be inclined to limit its own participation? Second, should not the Europeans be in a position to exercise some real measure of influence and control over weapons that are no less essential to their security than to our own?"

To Norstad, long a strong supporter of a NATO nuclear-strike force, the answer to both questions is yes. Under his plan, NATO's three nuclear producers—the U.S., Britain and France—would create a stockpile of weapons. "Whatever these countries agree to put in," he said, "should, in an emergency, be available in the common interest, unimpaired by the possibility of a last-minute veto by one or another of the nuclear powers." At the heart of Norstad's plan is the creation of an executive committee whose nucleus would be the Big Three. In this respect, the plan is reminiscent of Charles de Gaulle's longstanding—and long-rebuffed—demand for a U.S.-British-French triumvirate to direct NATO. But Norstad adds that the committee he envisions would be "open to all powers whenever their interests may be directly or critically involved."

Majority Rule. How would the committee decide whether to squeeze the nuclear trigger—the key question of all? Said Norstad: "In the interest of prompt decision, the committee, and through it the alliance, should be ruled by the decision of the majority. The majority decision would not bind, at least initially, a nation positively dissenting."

Norstad was the first to admit his plan is "imperfect" as it stands. But he insisted on its merit as a measure toward "putting at least one of the rooms of our house in some order. It would bring the NATO nuclear capability under the collective authority of the alliance, while still respecting the sovereign rights and responsibilities of the separate nuclear powers." As such, he said, "it is worth considering."

face ships and submarines would be manned by mixed crews from all the NATO nations, and any one of those nations would have a veto power over a decision to fire a nuclear weapon.

As of now, the structure of MLF is still being negotiated, and the plan does not seem likely to go much farther. Last week a new and far more sophisticated "sharing" plan was proposed by NATO's onetime Commander Norstad (see box).

Deterrent by Declaration. The most obvious proposition in the debate over the use and control of nuclear weapons is that no one wants a nuclear war. Despite all the hot words, this is as true of Goldwater as of Johnson.

Goldwater believes that the best deterrent to such a war is a clear and well-understood declaration that the U.S. will, if necessary, defend its vital international interests with nuclear weaponry. In urging this point, he has indulged in some imprecise language.


He has helped create for himself the political image of a man who would consider using atomic weapons to "defoliate" trees in South Viet Nam so as to deprive Communist guerrillas of their protective jungle cover. He has been mistaken in saying that the smallest nuclear weapon is no more powerful than World War II artillery charges. He has, in many ways, given the impression of a man who does not really know what he is talking about, and should not, therefore, be permitted to put his atomic ignorance into effect as national policy.

Johnson, superb politician that he is, has taken advantage of almost everything Goldwater has said. Campaigning for re-election as the great peace keeper, he keeps invoking "national security" as a brake on what he can say. But he has not said all he could, and he has indulged in some imprecision himself. He gets across the notion, for instance, that Goldwater is irresponsible and reckless because he has suggested that NATO's supreme commander ought to be given some sort of contingency authority for using tactical nuclear weapons—at a time when General Lemnitzer, under a delegation of power from Johnson, has just such authority.

One Billion Tons. Will the nuclear issue be clarified, and cooled off, before election day? Perhaps too much has already been said, and badly said at that, by the two candidates, for them ever to engage in meaningful debate.

Just last week Russia's Nikita Khrushchev told some visiting Japanese that the Soviet Union has perfected a sensational new weapon "that is a means of the destruction and extermination of humanity."

What was the weapon? Was it what famed U.S. Physicist Ralph Lapp calls a "gigaton" bomb—a nuclear weapon packing the power of a billion tons of TNT that could be detonated 100 miles off the U.S.'s coastline and still set off a 50-ft. tidal wave that would sweep across much of the entire North Ameri-



SECRETARY McNAMARA ON TV
Getting the word can be tough.

can continent? Was it a cobalt bomb that would send a deadly cloud sweeping forever about the earth? A "death ray" or a germ bomb? Or even an empty boast? Two days later Nikita Khrushchev said it wasn't nuclear, and, besides, he had been misinterpreted. For public consumption, his weapon had been cooled off.

It was quite a performance, and one that only a dictator could bring off. But, as one U.S. journalist warned, it would be "struthious"* folly to ignore the implications of what Khrushchev said. In the same sense, it would be struthious for the U.S. electorate to base its November judgment on the notion that either presidential candidate has discussed the nuclear control issue accurately or fully.

THE CAMPAIGN

The Old Nonpoliticker

Sacramento's shrieking, surging mob of some 100,000 sent Lyndon Johnson into transports of delight. After reluctantly escaping from his admirers, Johnson winked at aides, chortled and asked: "Now how was *that* for a crowd?" "Oh," replied a staffer, "pretty good." For a moment, Lyndon looked as though he had been smacked in the face with a wet mop. Then he realized that he was being joshed, and grinned more broadly than ever.

The Sacramento ovation was a highlight of a Johnson week that was billed as "nonpolitical." But if Lyndon gets any more nonpolitical than he was last week, heaven help the Republicans.

Nonexistent Speechwriter. Johnson did, of course, make a few bows to political nonpartisanship. On a flight to Miami Beach to deliver a speech to the International Association of Machinists,

* Ostrichlike.

he took a look at the text that had been prepared for him, crossed out 19 paragraphs that he considered too controversial. Deleted, for example, was a section pointing out that the Communist takeover of Cuba occurred in 1959 (during a Republican Administration) and that the island has since become a "showcase of failure."

Trouble was, reporters had already been given advance texts of the speech, and were starting to write their stories when White House Press Aide Malcolm Kilduff, traveling on the newsmen's plane, ordered that no mention of the deleted paragraphs should be made. Intimating that the objectionable sections had been put in by White House speechwriters unbeknownst to Lyndon, Kilduff ordered: "No reference—repeat, no reference—will be made to that part which has been deleted."

As it happened, every newsman present knew that L.B.J. likes to give the impression that he is the original author of all of his speeches. A reporter coyly asked how a speechwriter (nonexistent) could possibly put anything into a speech that the President himself had written. Kilduff, painted into a corner by L.B.J.'s little fiction, could only smile ruefully and say to the reporter: "You son of a bitch."

Peep Through the Periscope. And so, on to Miami Beach, where Lyndon delivered a sterilized, above-the-battle, President-of-all-the-people speech to the Machinists, then whisked on up to Cape Kennedy for an unscheduled inspection tour. There he donned a surgical-looking white nylon cap and gown, went through a pre-satellite-shoot "clean room," peered through a periscope at a Saturn rocket being groomed for flight, gave missile workers a few little keeper-of-the-peace pep talks.

But all this was prelude to his biggest nonpolitical trip of the week—a two-day sortie to the Far West to meet Canada's Prime Minister Lester Pearson and sign a Columbia River treaty between the two nations. Maybe the presidential jet just kept running out of gas—but in any event there were five stops before and after, from which Tammany's old bosses could take lessons in the fine old art of nonpoliticizing.

The President flew first to Malmstrom Air Force Base in Great Falls, Mont., plunged into a crowd of 7,000 for some handshaking, accepted a pair of beaded moccasins (size 10—but he's size 12) from a group of Indians, was so caught up in it all that he nearly missed the arrival of Canada's Pearson.

Pearson steered Lyndon aboard his Canadian government JetStar, and the two settled down for a two-hour flying inspection of three dam sites designed to harness the waters of the Columbia River system for huge hydroelectric and irrigation projects.

When Johnson stepped off the JetStar in Vancouver, British Columbia, he was outside the U.S. for the first time since



JOHNSON AT CAPE KENNEDY


Later, a couple of geniuses to uncork.

he became President. He and Pearson drove to Blaine, Wash., to sign the treaty at the base of the 67-ft. Peace Arch, astride the westernmost point of the U.S.-Canadian border. It was pouring rain, so Pearson cut his scheduled speech to a few perfunctory words. But not Lyndon: with 10,000 people, many of them U.S. voters, clustered around the arch, Lyndon talked for ten minutes.

Curving Radar. Airborne again in his own plane, Lyndon headed for Seattle, nonpoliticked his way through a rush-hour crowd of more than 30,000 before delivering his address on nuclear-arms control. Though Lyndon's original itinerary ended with Seattle, he flew on to Portland, Ore., then to the wild reception in Sacramento.

There, he uncorked a couple of geniuses from the bottle of U.S. military science. "We have now developed and tested two systems with the ability to intercept and destroy armed satellites circling the earth in space," Lyndon told the crowd. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara later said that both systems have intercepted orbiting satellites "hundreds of miles" in space during test shots. Neither system is as much a breakthrough as a solid advance in technology. One is derived from the Army's Nike-Zeus anti-missile missile, the other from the Air Force's Thor—both of which were initiated during the Eisenhower Administration.

Lyndon's other genie was an "over-the-horizon" radar system that "will literally look around the curve of the earth, alerting us to aircraft, and especially missiles, within seconds after they are launched." The system, which works by bouncing signals off the ionosphere to detect missiles and aircraft far beyond the horizon, could give the U.S. almost twice as much warning time against surprise attack as the 15-minute period now provided by



GOLDWATER IN MACON, GA.

Elsewhere, better than the Beatles.

U.S. ground and airborne radar stations.

As long as he was in the neighborhood, Lyndon decided to drop in at Salt Lake City after his Sacramento speech for a motorcade through the central district and a half-hour visit with the ailing head of the Mormons, 91-year-old David O. McKay. Only then was President Johnson, his hands swollen and bruised from all that hand-shaking, ready to call it quits. "We're going back to Washington," he said, "and go to work."

Marching Through Dixie

Barry Goldwater marched through Dixie last week, hitting 14 cities during a four-day, eight-state tour of the Old Confederacy. In Memphis, he drew 30,000 people to the grassy slopes of River Bluff, not far from the Mississippi. In Montgomery, a near-capacity crowd of 24,000 turned out at Cramton Bowl, including 700 white-gowned local belles who lined the field from goalpost to goalpost waving American flags. In New Orleans, the 82,000-seat Sugar Bowl was only one-third filled, but Barry still outdrew the Beatles, who had lured only 12,000 the night before.

"Orville Wrong." In his speeches Barry did not make a single specific reference to civil rights, even though his vote against this year's Civil Rights bill is responsible for much of his widespread Southern support. Rather, he concentrated on attacks against Lyndon Johnson and his Cabinet. He labeled Lyndon "the wildest spender of them all," despite claims of frugality. He called Johnson a "scheming wirepuller" who ought to rename the White House the "White-wash House." Lyndon, he cracked, "has asked for so much power that the Democrats don't know whether to vote for him or plug him in." Turning to the Cabinet, he promised that his "first job as President" would be to fire Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, then got

in a dig at Agriculture Secretary Orville Freeman by telling a North Carolina audience, "We've gone from Orville Wright to Orville Wrong."

Despite his generally warm reception, Goldwater persisted in his penchant for saying the right thing in the wrong place. Items:

► In St. Petersburg, Fla., Barry banged away at "the failure of public officials to keep the streets safe from bullies and marauders." This was hardly a matter of burning concern in peaceful St. Pete. At the same time, Goldwater failed to mention his attitudes about Social Security, even though his audience consisted mostly of elderly pensioners.

► In Knoxville, Tenn., where folks display bumper stickers reading KEEP TVA—I'D RATHER SELL ARIZONA, Barry said he would "stand by" his recent statement that TVA's steam-generating plants should be sold to private interests. Anyhow, he said, his views make little difference, since even if he were President, he undoubtedly would be overruled by Congress.

► In Atlanta, Barry issued a scathing denunciation of the Supreme Court's one-man-one-vote reapportionment ruling. Of all the cities in the South, Atlanta, which has long chafed under state malapportionment's giving rural districts top-heavy power in the state legislature, is the one place where the Supreme Court ruling is reasonably popular.

► In Charleston, W.Va., Barry blasted Lyndon Johnson's war on poverty as a "phony, vote-getting gimmick" and "a raid on your pocketbooks." West Virginia, of course, is practically a case-book study of the depressed area.

As Barry traveled through the South, two breaks went his way. South Carolina's Senator J. Strom Thurmond, the Dixiecrat candidate for President in 1948, formally severed his ties to the Democratic Party, announced that he was joining the Republican Party and